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PRODUCTS LIABILITY—CONFLICT PREEMPTION: 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DENIES 
PREEMPTION DEFENSE FOR DRUG MANUFACTURERS 
USING FDA-APPROVED WARNING LABELS 
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) 
ABSTRACT 
 
The United States Supreme Court held a plaintiff’s defective warning 
claims were not preempted by federal law or the Federal Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) regulations.  Part I of this article provides the factual back-
ground in which the plaintiff’s arm was amputated after she was given an 
injection of Phenergan, a drug manufactured by Wyeth, and developed 
gangrene.  The plaintiff brought defective warning claims against Wyeth in 
a Vermont state court.  Wyeth’s defense was that federal laws and regula-
tions preempted the plaintiff’s claims due to conflict preemption because, 
Wyeth argued, state tort suits would conflict with the purposes and 
objectives of federal laws and regulations, and state tort suits made it 
impossible to comply with both federal and state regulations.  The jury 
returned verdicts against Wyeth, which were upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Part II gives a brief summary of the history of FDA regulations and 
preemption principles prior to Wyeth v. Levine.  Part III analyzes the 
majority and minority opinions of the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine.  
Finally, Part IV outlines the impact of the Wyeth v. Levine opinion on 
subsequent court opinions. 
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I. FACTS 
In 2006, the Vermont Supreme Court held Federal Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) label requirements were only minimum requirements, a drug 
manufacturer could create stronger warnings without prior FDA approval, 
and, consequently, a jury verdict finding a drug manufacturer liable on a 
failure to warn claim was not preempted.1  The United States Supreme 
Court upheld the Vermont state court decision in Wyeth v. Levine,2 holding 
FDA approval of the drug Phenergan’s warning label did not preempt a 
state tort suit.3  Phenergan’s manufacturer, Wyeth, previously submitted a 
revised label in 1988 in response to the FDA’s request for different warn-
ings concerning the risk of Phenergan, an irritant, coming into contact with 
arterial blood.4  The FDA did not respond to the proposed revisions about 
intra-arterial injections until 1996 and simply instructed Wyeth to “retain 
verbiage in current label.”5  Wyeth argued, in Wyeth v. Levine, that FDA 
approval and the mandate to retain the warning label on Phenergan meant 
any state tort suit based on the adequacy of the warning label would be 
preempted and, therefore, dismissed.6  The argument was that preemption 
was implicated because the FDA found the warning safe and effective, but a 
jury verdict ultimately deemed the same label unreasonably dangerous.7 
The plaintiff, Diana Levine, developed gangrene and suffered amputa-
tion of her right arm after she was given Phenergan for relief from nausea 
due to a migraine.8  Phenergan could be administered intra-muscularly or 
intravenously.9  The two intravenous methods included IV-drip and IV-
push.10  IV-drip was a slower method, where the drug and saline solution 
were in a hanging bag and flowed through a catheter into the patient’s 
 
1. See generally Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 VT 107, 183 Vt. 76, 944 A.2d 179. 
2. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).  The author will abbreviate the case as Levine because Wyeth has 
been a party in several cases cited in this article. 
3. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1192.  The warning stated, “extreme care should be exercised to avoid” injection of 
Phenergan into arterial blood.  Levine, 2006 VT 107, ¶ 4 n.1, 183 Vt. 76, 944 A.2d 179.  The 
warning label further stated reports “suggest” gangrene would be likely if Phenergan came into 
contact with arterial blood. Id.  Unintended arterial placement of the needle was “suspect” in these 
reports. Id.  The warning label advised the preferable administration method was to inject 
Phenergan “through the tubing of an intravenous infusion set.” Id. 
6. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249). 
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19, Wyeth v. 
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249). 
8. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191. 
9. Id. Intramuscular administration is a direct injection into muscular tissue and does not 
include the risk of Phenergan coming into contact with arterial blood.  WESTGROUP, AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE PROOF OF FACTS 119 (3d ed. 2002). 
10. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1191. 
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vein.11  IV-push was a direct injection into the vein.12  The risk of gangrene 
due to Phenergan’s contact with arterial blood was always present and 
could not be eliminated during IV-push because the needle could either hit 
an artery, or Phenergan could escape into the vein.13  These risks were 
almost non-existent with the IV-drip method.14 
Plaintiff Levine sued the drug manufacturer, Wyeth, under both negli-
gence and strict liability theories in Vermont state court, claiming damages 
due to pain and suffering, medical expenses, and loss of livelihood as a pro-
fessional musician.15  Wyeth filed a motion for summary judgment based 
on the preemption defense, arguing Wyeth was required to comply solely 
with the FDA-approved labeling.16  The Vermont Superior Court rejected 
Wyeth’s motion and determined the FDA had not “specifically disallowed” 
any stronger language.17  The jury found Wyeth negligent, declared 
Phenergan a defective product because of its warning label, and awarded 
Levine $7.4 million.18  The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed.19  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of “whether 
the FDA’s drug labeling judgments preempt state law product liability 
claims premised on the theory that different labeling judgments were 
necessary to make drugs reasonably safe for use” and affirmed the rulings 
and verdicts from the lower courts.20 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Realizing the significance of the analysis and decision in Wyeth v. 
Levine requires an examination of the history of FDA regulation and con-
flict preemption.  Pre-Levine confusion was created largely by evolving 
FDA regulations and changing FDA opinions.21  Preemption is clearly pro-
vided for in the Supremacy Clause.22  Preemption jurisprudence includes 
three levels of preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and 
 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 1192. 
14. Id.  The solution will not flow into an artery or surrounding tissue if the catheter is not in 
a vein. Id. 
15. Id. at 1191. 
16. Id. at 1192. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 1193. 
19. Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 VT 107, ¶ 5, 183 Vt. 76, 944 A.2d 179 (rejecting Wyeth’s claim 
that the trial court failed in dismissing Levine’s inadequate label claim on preemption grounds and 
also affirming the damages provisions). 
20. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1193, 1204. 
21. See id. at 1200-03. 
22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
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implied conflict preemption.23  Wyeth’s defense in Wyeth v. Levine was that 
Levine’s state claim was preempted by federal regulations because of con-
flict preemption.24  Conflict preemption is controversial due to the uncer-
tainty of Congressional intent in creating regulations, varying levels of 
authority granted to numerous federal agencies, and changing principles of 
important conflict preemption concepts.25 
A. FDA REGULATION EVOLUTION 
Two federal bodies are responsible for the regulations at issue:  (1) 
Congress is responsible for creating and amending the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA);26 and (2) The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) is responsible for implementing regulations.27  Prior to the FDA and 
the FDCA, state tort suits were the only protection afforded to consumers.28  
The FDA regulates a field involving health and safety—a position tradition-
ally occupied by states—out of necessity for greater consumer safety.29 
1. Objectives of the FDCA 
Congress created the FDCA in the 1930s due to the prevalence of un-
safe drugs and fraudulent marketing of drugs.30  The initial Act required 
manufacturers to submit new drug applications, reports, and proposed labels 
to the FDA in order to gain the requisite premarket approval of drugs and 
their labels.31  The FDA could reject a drug’s entrance onto the market if 
the FDA determined a drug was not safe for use as labeled.32  In the original 
provisions of the FDCA, the FDA had to prove a drug was unsafe in order 
to keep that drug off the market.33  In 1962, Congress shifted the burden of 
 
23. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 
(1985).  Express preemption occurs when Congress expressly states a federal law preempts a state 
law. Id.  Field preemption occurs where federal regulation is so extensive in an area of law there is 
no room left for state law in the same area. Id.  Implied conflict preemption occurs where there is 
an actual conflict between federal and state law because it is physically impossible to comply with 
both or because “state law stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 
Id. 
24. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1193. 
25. See id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating the majority opinion “turned yesterday’s 
dissent into today’s majority opinion.”) 
26. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938). 
27. See generally Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195-1204 (explaining the role of the FDA). 
28. Id. at 1195. 
29. Id. at 1194-95.  Congress’s first act was the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, which 
prohibited the manufacturer and shipment of misbranded or tainted drugs and was meant to 
supplement state regulations and common law liability. Id. at 1195. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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proof regarding a drug’s safety and effectiveness from the FDA to the 
manufacturer.34  The manufacturer was required to prove the drug was safe 
for use according to the drug label and instructions.35  Congress also added 
a “savings clause,”36 whereby a state law would be invalidated if there was 
a “direct and positive conflict” with the FDCA.37 
The FDCA allows manufacturers to change a drug’s label in two 
ways.38  First, a drug manufacturer can file a supplemental application with 
the FDA and change the label upon FDA approval.39  Second, a manu-
facturer can change a drug’s label before gaining FDA approval if 
necessary to “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or 
adverse reaction . . .” or to “add or strengthen an instruction about dosage 
and administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug 
product.”40  The second method is a result of “changes being effected” 
(CBE) regulations and may be done upon the manufacturer filing a supple-
mental application.41 
2. The FDA’s Changing Opinion 
Along with implementing regulations created by Congress, federal 
agencies often create regulations or rules that have preemptive effect.42  
Because an agency is uniquely qualified to evaluate the effect of regulations 
on state law, an agency’s views are usually entitled to deference.43  Prior to 
2006, the FDA’s official position was that state tort suits were meant to 
complement federal regulations in providing greater consumer safety.44  In 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 28, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) 
[hereinafter Brief of the Chamber of Commerce]. 
37. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196. 
38. Id. 
39. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(a) (2008).  See also Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196. 
40. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2008).  See also Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196. 
41. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2008).  See also Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196. 
42. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (“Federal 
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes” as long as the agency administra-
tor does not exceed his or her authority or act contrary to congressional approval). 
43. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). 
44. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202-03; Brief of Amici Curiae Former FDA Commissioners Dr. 
Donald Kennedy and Dr. David A. Kessler in Support of Respondent at 2-4, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 
S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of Former FDA Commissioners] (stating state 
law enhanced consumer safety—the goal of federal regulation—because state tort suits brought 
information to light which was unknown to the FDA, state tort suits created an incentive to drug 
manufacturers to make risks known, and state tort suits provided compensation for victims which 
was not provided by federal law). 
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2006, the FDA declared, in a preamble to the FDCA, that the FDCA estab-
lishes both a floor and a ceiling on labeling requirements, so FDA approval 
of a label preempts state law or state common-law actions that conflict with 
or contradict its judgment.45  The FDA’s 2006 preamble also declared that 
state-law failure to warn claims threaten the FDA’s role as an expert agency 
charged with the responsibility of evaluating and regulating drugs.46  
Whether the FDA was correct in stating its authority or whether it really 
only created minimal requirements was contested in Levine and in courts 
around the nation.47 
B. GENERAL PREEMPTION 
Conflicts of law in the federal system are resolved through the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which declares federal 
law must remain supreme.48  The existence of federal drug regulations 
raises the preemption question in state tort suits.49  However, the preemp-
tion defense was rarely successful in blocking state common law personal 
injury and products liability claims until the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992 
decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.50  The preemption defense is 
premised on the assertion that a particular federal regulation forecloses an 
inconsistent state law regulation or state products liability judgment.51  The 
existence of preemption often depends upon the claim for relief.52 
Preemption analysis usually begins with “the assumption that the his-
toric police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal 
Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”53  
Preemption defenses may be expressly provided for.54  Preemption may 
 
45. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.  This floor and ceiling argument means the FDA’s 
determinations were conclusive on both the minimum and the maximum warnings allowed on 
labels.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 11. 
46. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1200. 
47. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249). 
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
49. See LITIGATING TORT CASES § 60:30 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano 
eds. 2003). 
50. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (No. 90-
1038).  The Petitioner noted preemption of a state personal injury action, where federal law 
provided no alternative remedy, had never once been successful until the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled Cipollone’s claims were preempted. Id. at 4. 
51. DAVID G. OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY & MARY J. DAVIS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND 
SAFETY 372 (Foundation Press 5th ed. 2007). 
52. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (clarifying the difference between the jury’s verdict that 
the warning was insufficient, rather than demanding a particular warning that eliminated IV-push 
altogether). 
53. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
54. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-18. 
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also be implied in federal laws and regulations through field preemption or 
conflict preemption.55  Wyeth argued the defense of implied conflict pre-
emption in the Court.56  Implied conflict preemption includes both an 
“impossibility” test57 and a “purposes and objectives” test.58  Both the 
impossibility and the purposes and objectives test depend upon a finding 
that federal and state laws actually conflict.59 
C. IMPLIED CONFLICT PREEMPTION 
State law is impliedly preempted by federal law and regulations where 
state and federal law actually conflict, even if preemption was not expressly 
provided.60  State law is “created” through jury verdicts because judgments 
essentially create a requirement for which a defendant must comply in order 
to escape liability, and so state tort suits may be preempted by federal regu-
lations.61  Federal regulations created by agencies may have the same 
preemptive effect as congressional action if Congress has given the agency 
the authority to create regulations with preemptive force.62  Regulations 
preempt state law if they either make compliance with both federal regula-
tions and state law impossible or if the state law stands as an obstacle to the 
purposes and objectives of Congress.63 
1. Congressional Intent 
Congress’s purpose in enacting a statute or regulation is the “ultimate 
touchstone in every pre-emption case.”64  Congressional intent is presumed 
 
55. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31.  Field preemption occurs where a federal scheme is so 
pervasive in a particular area or field that a court may reasonably assume Congress did not intend 
to allow state law to supplement the federal laws in that field. Id. at 230.  Wyeth, previously 
known as American Home Products, Inc., argued field preemption at the trial level, but conceded 
in the Vermont Supreme Court that field preemption did not exist in this case.  Levine v. Am. 
Home Products, Inc., No. 670-12-01, 2004 WL 5456809 (Vt. Super. July 30, 2004); Levine, 129 
S. Ct. at 1192. 
56. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1192. 
57. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
58. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 n.20 (1941)). 
59. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000).  The difference in 
the implied preemption approaches is not legally significant but is only a “terminological wedge.” 
Id. 
60. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153. 
61. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992).  See also Geier, 529 U.S. at 
882 (stating the Court’s preemption cases assume state tort judgments require compliance, so state 
tort judgments may actually conflict with federal laws or regulations). 
62. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54. 
63. Id. at 153. 
64. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 
375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).  Contrarily, Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion in Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., “It is not our job to speculate upon congressional motives.”  128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 
(2008). 
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to exist where Congress created a law that actually conflicts with state law 
or where Congress vested a federal agency with the authority to create 
regulations that conflict with state law.65  The scope of any preemption 
provision depends upon the congressional purpose derived from statutory 
language, the statutory framework, and the structure and purpose of a 
statute.66  A state jury verdict can conflict with federal regulation merely if 
it upsets congressional objectives.67  The strength of a regulation is essential 
in an implied conflict preemption analysis.68 
2. Federal Agency Authority 
One way Congress creates preemption of state law is through federal 
agencies and federal regulations.69  Federal regulations have the same pre-
emptive effect as federal statutes.70  A federal agency does not need to 
make an express statement identifying a conflict in order for preemption to 
apply as long as there is an actual conflict.71  An agency’s interpretation of 
a law’s preemptive effect is given deference “when it [is clear] Congress 
delegated the authority to an agency to make rules carrying the force of 
law . . . .”72 
An example of an agency with the authority to promulgate regulations 
with the force of law can be found in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 
Inc.73  In Geier, the Department of Transportation’s interpretation of the 
regulations at issue was given great deference because Congress delegated 
the authority to the Department “to implement the statute; the subject matter 
[was] technical; and the relevant history and background [were] complex 
and extensive.”74  The agency was thus “uniquely qualified” to interpret the 
regulations and determine their preemptive effect.75  Similarly, Congress 
expressly granted the FDA the authority to implement the provisions of the 
Medical Device Act and exempt state regulations from the Act’s 
 
65. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54. 
66. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485-86. 
67. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000). 
68. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 681, for the 
proposition that the Court “has recognized an agency regulation with the force of law can pre-
empt conflicting state requirements”). 
69. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54. 
70. Id. 
71. Geier, 529 U.S. at 884-85. 
72. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (discussing the Chevron 
deference). 
73. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
74. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883. 
75. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996)). 
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preemptive effect.76  The FDA was “require[d]” to assess the preemptive 
effect of the Act, and the Court’s opinion in Lohr was “informed” by the 
FDA’s determination.77  However, the Court has also suggested that 
changing agency positions may be entitled to less deference.78  Thus, it may 
be difficult to determine whether certain agencies have authority to create 
preemptive regulations or whether agency opinions may be ignored. 
3. Savings Clauses 
Another unclear area of pre-Levine conflict preemption jurisprudence 
involves the effectiveness of savings clauses.79  Congress will sometimes 
draft federal safety statutes with a savings clause, which expresses in some 
manner the legislation is not intended to replace state tort suits, but instead 
“saves” them.80  The purpose of a savings clause is to ensure an injured 
plaintiff has a private remedy under the law.81  However, a savings clause 
does not always preserve state tort remedies against an implied conflict 
preemption challenge.82 
For example, the Court in Geier determined the express preemption 
provision read with the savings clause required a narrow reading of the 
preemption clause so that a significant number of common law liability 
cases would be saved.83  However, the savings clause did not bar the possi-
bility that implied conflict preemption may block common law liability.84  
The savings clause did not suggest intent to save state tort causes of action 
that conflicted with federal regulations.85  A savings clause may operate to 
save common law actions where federal regulation creates a floor or 
minimum requirement on manufacturers’ duties.86  The regulations in Geier 
were not subject to the savings clause because saving common law suits 
would upset the purposes and objectives of federal regulations that consti-
tuted both a floor and a ceiling on what manufacturers could do.87 
 
76. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495-96. 
77. Id. 
78. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008).  The Court mentioned changing 
agency positions may be entitled to less deference in passing because it was clear in Riegel what 
the express preemption clause meant. Id. 
79. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 869-74 (holding a savings clause ineffective). 
80. OWEN, MONTGOMERY & DAVIS, supra note 51, at 373. 
81. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002). 
82. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74. 
83. Id. at 868. The clause stated compliance with a federal safety standard did not provide an 
exemption from common law liability. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)). 
84. Id. at 869. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 870. 
87. Id. 
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4. Presumption Against Preemption 
The presumption against preemption was another uncertain piece of 
conflict preemption jurisprudence after the Geier decision because it went 
unmentioned.88  Normally, both express and implied preemption analyses 
begin “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
[are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”89  The presumption against preemption 
applies with “particular force” where Congress acts in areas constituting the 
traditional police powers of health, safety, welfare, and morals.90  There-
fore, courts should avoid applying preemption if a piece of federal legisla-
tion has more than one possible meaning.91  Dissenting Justices often argue 
the presumption against preemption should only apply when determining 
whether preemption exists, but the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated 
the presumption applies when determining the scope of preemption as 
well.92  The presumption against preemption is intended to maintain the 
historic primacy of state regulations in health and safety concerns.93 
The United States Supreme Court clarified the conflict preemption 
doctrine in Levine, regarding agency authority, the presumption against 
preemption, and savings clauses.94  The Court appears to have tightened 
conflict preemption tests, making them more difficult to plead.  The Court’s 
decision will likely demand a detailed analysis of an agency’s history and 
authority before a state tort suit will be preempted in an area which the state 
has traditionally occupied. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Levine, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.95  The majority 
 
88. See Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 181, 211 (2004) (discussing the Court’s opinion in Geier, which said the savings 
clause and the express preemption provision did not create a special burden on the defense of 
presumption, causing commentators to suggest the presumption was irrelevant).  Wyeth argued in 
its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari the presumption does not apply when the area at issue has a 
history of significant federal presence.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 24. 
89. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
90. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (citing Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 458 (1996)). 
91. Id. (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). 
92. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.  See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545-46 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
93. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.  State law may be preempted even if a federal law or regulation 
affects health or safety concerns.  See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) 
(holding the Medical Device Amendment (MDA) barred many state tort suits on medical devices). 
94. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-1204 (2009). 
95. Id. at 1190. 
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held Levine’s claims were not preempted because it was not impossible for 
Wyeth to comply with both FDA regulations and the state verdict.96  The 
majority also held preemption did not apply because Congress’s objectives 
were to create greater consumer safety by the FDA regulations comple-
menting state verdicts.97  The majority reasoned that Congress provided a 
way for manufacturers to remain responsible for drug labels and that 
Congress did not grant the FDA authority to declare preemption on its 
own.98  Justice Breyer joined the majority and filed a concurring opinion in 
Levine.99  Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment and filed an 
opinion.100  Justice Alito dissented and filed an opinion, in which Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia joined.101 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
The existence of the implied preemption defense depends upon the 
claim for relief.102  The jury verdict found Wyeth negligent and Phenergan a 
defective product due to insufficient warnings and instructions.103  Signifi-
cantly, the jury found Wyeth had a duty to provide a sufficient warning but 
did not demand the warning be replaced by another warning.104  The Court 
focused simply on whether an inadequate warning claim was preempted, 
rather than on whether a state could mandate a certain warning or proscribe 
certain uses.105  A jury verdict mandating contraindication of the IV-push 
method, in spite of the FDA’s decision that IV-push was safe, may have 
resulted in a different decision by the Court.106  The majority opinion 
focused on the cornerstones of preemption, conflict preemption based upon 
impossibility, congressional purposes and objectives in enacting laws and 
regulations, and the continued importance of state tort suits in drug warning 
label safety. 
 
96. Id. at 1199. 
97. Id. at 1202-04. 
98. Id. at 1197-98, 1201. 
99. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
100. Id. at 1204-17 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
101. Id. at 1217-31 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
102. See id. at 1194 (Levine’s claim may have asked for a ruling that IV-push be prohibited, 
but the appealed verdict only found the label inadequate). 
103. Id. at 1193. 
104. Id. at 1194. 
105. Id.  Wyeth argued Levine’s claim should be preempted because Levine apparently 
argued Phenergan’s label should foreclose IV-push injection altogether before the trial court.  
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 2. 
106. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (noting the FDA chose not to contraindicate IV-push 
administration, so a jury verdict mandating contraindication likely would directly conflict with the 
FDA’s specific ruling). 
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1. The Cornerstones of Preemption 
The Court’s analysis began with the cornerstones of preemption: the 
supremacy of Congressional purpose and the presumption against preemp-
tion.107  In Levine, the presumption against preemption applied because 
state tort suits have always been available for consumers injured by defec-
tive drugs.108  Health and safety are traditionally state law issues, so the 
presumption against preemption applies to protect state interests from being 
“cavalierly” preempted by federal law.109  The dissent argued the presump-
tion against preemption did not apply in implied conflict preemption, but 
the majority of the Court made clear the presumption does apply in implied 
conflict preemption analyses.110  The mere existence of the FDCA was not 
enough to overcome the presumption against preemption.111 
The Congressional purpose in enacting and amending the FDCA has 
always been to protect consumers from harmful products and fraudulent 
marketing.112  The Court determined the FDCA’s provision that state law 
would only be invalidated upon a “direct and positive conflict” with the 
FDA was a savings clause.113  Congress increased the FDA’s powers over 
time, but Congress also enacted the savings clause, and state tort suits 
continued.114  Congress consistently rejected enacting express preemption 
provisions, gave manufacturers the duty to prove their labels were adequate, 
and rejected a provision that would require the FDA to pre-approve all 
changes to drug labels.115  Congress also failed to provide remedies for 
injured consumers through the FDCA.116  The Court determined Congress 
did not provide a federal remedy because it intended state law to continue to 
provide remedies to injured consumers.117  The Court considered these 
factors as proof Congress never intended to remove the manufacturer’s duty 
 
107. Id. at 1194-95. 
108. Id. at 1195 n.3. 
109. Id. 
110. Id.  The dissent noted the Geier Court “specifically rejected” the presumption against 
preemption. Id. at 1228.  One commentator noted the Levine decision brought the “fabled” 
presumption “back in vogue.”  David G. Savage, Business Downturn, A.B.A. J., May 2009, at 21. 
111. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3. 
112. Id. at 1195. 
113. Id. at 1196.  The opposing argument was that the “savings clause” was an attempt to 
preserve conflict preemption of state tort suits, not to save state tort suits from preemption.  Brief 
of the Chamber of Commerce, supra note 36, at 28. 
114. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196. 
115. Id. at 1196.  The Court specifically noted Congress enacted an express preemption 
provision for medical devices but did not do the same for drugs. Id. 
116. Id. at 1199.  This “lack of federal remedy” assertion was argued and denied in 
Cipollone.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 50, at 27. 
117. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199-1200. 
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to create and maintain safe labels.118  While keeping the cornerstones of 
preemption in mind, the Court turned to the conflict preemption tests: 
impossibility and congressional purposes and objectives.119 
2. Conflict Preemption Based Upon Impossibility 
The Court denied Wyeth’s argument that Levine’s claims were pre-
empted because it was not impossible for Wyeth to comply with the FDA’s 
requirements and Wyeth’s manufacturer duties under state law.120  The 
court declared that impossibility is a demanding defense.121 Wyeth argued it 
was impossible to comply with the state verdict because it could not change 
the warning without FDA approval of a supplemental application.122  
However, the Court reasoned drug manufacturers retained their common 
law duties to warn, CBE regulations made it possible for Wyeth to comply 
with federal regulations and common law duties, and Wyeth would not 
have been guilty of “misbranding” if Wyeth made changes to make the 
label safer.123 
First, the Court determined the CBE regulations allowed Wyeth to 
“‘add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reac-
tion’ or to ‘add or strengthen an instruction’” if it would make use of the 
product safer.124  Wyeth could strengthen the label upon discovering newly 
acquired information consisting of new information of risks and data or new 
analyses of previously submitted data.125  Wyeth could have changed 
Phenergan’s label upon discovering the risk of gangrene from IV-push 
administration was more frequent or severe than previously known.126  
Wyeth had the ability and knowledge to make changes before FDA 
approval, as long as Wyeth filed a supplemental application with the FDA 
upon making any changes.127 
 
118. Id. at 1199. 
119. Id. at 1196-1204. 
120. Id. at 1196-97. 
121. Id. at 1199. 
122. Id. at 1196-97. 
123. Id. at 1196-99. 
124. Id. at 1196. 
125. Id. at 1196-97 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2008)).  A 2008 
amendment allows a manufacturer to utilize the CBE method only if the new warning is based on 
“newly acquired information.” Id.  Though the CBE regulations were created after Levine’s 2007 
injury, the Court determined the “newly acquired information” amendment still gave Wyeth the 
ability to change Phenergan’s warnings. Id. at 1197. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1196. 
         
2010] CASE COMMENT 419 
Wyeth argued the CBE regulations did not allow Wyeth to change 
Phenergan’s label.128  Wyeth’s argument was based on prior FDA consider-
ation of the risks of IV-push administration.129  Wyeth argued the FDA had 
adequate prior knowledge of the risks of gangrene due to IV-push admini-
stration, and the agency responded.130  Therefore, according to Wyeth, any 
information Wyeth received of IV-push incidents was not “newly 
acquired.”131  The Supreme Court disagreed and accepted Levine’s prior 
incident evidence, indicating Wyeth could have done more to make 
Phenergan’s label regarding the IV-push method safe.132  Wyeth “could 
have” analyzed subsequent incidents and added a stronger warning.133  
Therefore, it was not impossible for Wyeth to change Phenergan’s label to 
make it safer regarding the risks of IV-push administration while still 
complying with the FDA’s requirements.134 
Second, the Court also rejected Wyeth’s contention that changing the 
label would have constituted misbranding or unauthorized distribution and, 
therefore, subjected it to liability.135  Unauthorized distribution occurs 
where a new drug lacks an effective application with the FDA and is 
distributed.136  Complying with the jury’s verdict and making the warning 
stronger would not have made Phenergan a new drug without an effective 
FDA drug application.137  Misbranding assumes the label is adequate and 
changes would make the label inadequate, however a stronger warning 
would have likely made Phenergan more adequate.138  Further, the FDA 
does not have the authority to unilaterally determine a drug is mis-
branded.139  The Court also found it difficult to believe the FDA would 
bring an action against Wyeth for making Phenergan’s label safer under the 
CBE regulations.140 
 
128. Id. 
129. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 6-8. 
130. Id. at 7. 
131. Id. at 6-8.  See also Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199 (giving the history of the FDA’s 
consideration on IV-push administration and citing the lower court’s ruling that the label the FDA 
rejected was only different from, but not stronger than, the prior label). 
132. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1197. 
133. Id.  The Court also disregarded Wyeth’s argument the FDA still had to approve the 
changes eventually because eventual required approval did not make it impossible for the 
manufacturer to strengthen the label. Id. 
134. Id. at 1196-97. 
135. Id. at 1197. 
136. Id. 
137. Id.  
138. Id.  
139. Id.  Federal juries determine whether a drug is misbranded. Id. 
140. Id. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court made clear manu-
facturers are responsible for the adequacy of the initial warning label and 
remain responsible for the continuing adequacy of the label while a drug is 
on the market.141  Wyeth could not claim it did not have a duty to ensure the 
label was safe merely because the FDA determined the contents of the label 
were adequate before the drug made it to market.142  The Court examined 
the history of drug manufacturers’ duties throughout the existence of the 
FDA and noted manufacturer duties were retained.143  Ultimately, Wyeth 
had a duty to ensure Phenergan’s label was safe, and Wyeth could not prove 
an adequate warning was impossible to achieve under both federal and state 
law due to the CBE regulations.144  Beyond conflict preemption based on 
impossibility of compliance with both state and federal law, state tort suits 
may also be preempted where state suits conflict with congressional 
purposes and objectives in creating federal laws and regulations.145 
3. Conflict Based on Congressional Purposes and Objectives 
Wyeth’s preemption defense was also rejected under the purposes and 
objectives test because Congress was seeking to make drugs safer through 
the years, and state tort suits actually help achieve congressional goals.146  
Wyeth used the Court’s analysis from Geier, arguing Congress’s purpose 
was to grant the FDA complete authority in determining drug warning 
labels because it was an expert agency capable of striking a balance be-
tween competing objectives.147  Wyeth’s position, supported by the 2006 
preamble to the FDCA, was that the FDCA creates both a floor and a 
ceiling on drug regulation and that the FDA’s approval of a drug label was 
conclusive.148 
The Court rejected Wyeth’s arguments, stating Congress never pro-
vided a federal remedy for consumers harmed by drugs, which could only 
mean Congress intended state tort law remedies to remain intact for injured 
consumers.149  The Court noted Congress was aware of state tort suits when 
it created the FDCA and amended the Act throughout its existence.150  
 
141. Id. at 1197-98. 
142. Id. at 1198.  The Court recognized new risks are discovered over time and after drugs 
have already made it to the market. Id. at 1197. 
143. Id. at 1198. 
144. Id. 
145. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
146. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199. 
147. Id.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 46. 
148. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1199; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 3. 
149. Id. at 1199-1200. 
150. Id. 
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Congress created an express preemption clause regarding medical devices 
in the Medical Device Amendment (MDA) but did not do the same in the 
FDCA.151  Congress chose to remain silent on preemption even though 
Congress was aware of the “prevalence of state tort litigation,” which 
evidenced Congress’s intent for FDA regulations to be bolstered by state 
tort suits instead of displacing state suits.152 
The FDA is charged with determining whether a drug is safe and 
effective and whether the drug’s labels are adequate before the drug can go 
on the market, but it does not mean Congress’s purpose in creating the 
agency was also to remove the manufacturer’s common law duties.153  
Wyeth argued the FDA must have balanced the risks and benefits of 
Phenergan’s label proposals presented to it, and therefore state law would 
contradict FDA approval, as stated in the 2006 Preamble.154  However, 
Congress did not provide the FDA with the authority to declare the 
preemptive effect of the FDCA, and Congress’s purpose was only to create 
a floor for regulations on which state verdicts could build.155 
The Court in the past has examined an agency’s views of preemption 
although the Court denied giving deference to an agency’s conclusions.156  
The Court unequivocally stated it still does its own conflict analysis and 
does not simply accept an agency’s conclusions.157  Federal agency views 
may be given “weight” regarding the interplay between state tort law and 
agency regulations because agencies do have special knowledge and under-
standing of how the regulations actually work.158  How much weight the 
Court gives these opinions depends on the thoroughness, consistency, and 
persuasiveness of the agency’s explanation.159  The Court has given “sub-
stantial weight” to the FDA’s views on the preemptive effect of the MDA 
but the Court did not do the same in Levine.160 
 
151. Id. at 1200. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 1201.  Commentators previously noted the FDA did have the authority to create 
preemptive regulations but had not done so.  OWEN, MONTGOMERY & DAVIS, supra note 51, at 
394. 
156. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201. 
157. Id. at 1200-01.  The Court’s statements on an agency’s authority to declare preemptive 
effects have been interpreted by some courts to mean an agency’s explanations, but not agency 
conclusions, may be given deference.  Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1214 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
158. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201. 
159. Id. 
160. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (discussing the expertise of the 
FDA in determining the preemptive effect of the MDA and giving substantial weight to the FDA’s 
view of the MDA). 
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The Court rejected the FDA’s 2006 preamble statements.161  First, the 
FDA’s prior views were its regulations only created a floor and that state 
tort law could add to the regulations, providing greater consumer pro-
tection.162  In its proposed rulemaking in 2000, the FDA stated it would not 
make a rule implying state tort suits would be preempted.163  However, the 
FDA proceeded to do the opposite in the 2006 preamble with a strong view 
its regulations preempted state law.164  More importantly, the FDA’s new 
position was contrary to congressional views and objectives already decided 
by the Court.165  The FDA, therefore, did not have the necessary authority, 
nor did it have consistent opinions in order for the Court to give any weight 
to the FDA’s statements.166 
4. The State Tort Suit Advantage Over Federal Regulation 
The Court’s decision in Levine favors state tort suits for protecting 
consumers.  Prior to the 2006 preamble, the FDA considered state law tort 
suits to be “complementary” to drug regulations.167  The Court supported 
state law tort remedies, noting product safety is increased when manufac-
turers are subject to state tort suits.168  The Court supported its statements 
on the advantage of state tort suits with traditional products liability 
rationales, including increased safety incentives for manufacturers, reme-
dies for injured plaintiffs, and increased consumer confidence.169 
Several amici briefs provided evidence of how overworked and 
understaffed the FDA is and enumerated many FDA “failures” in keeping 
unsafe products off the market.170  Manufacturers who administer the 
studies on their drugs have greater access to study results and continue to 
receive information on the safety and effectiveness of drugs on the market; 
 
161. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201. 
162. Id. at 1202. 
163. Id. 
164. Id.  The Court called the FDA’s adoption of preemption language in the preamble, after 
stating it would not adopt preemption, a procedural failure. Id. 
165. Id.  The Court stated Congress gave the FDA the authority to determine the preemptive 
effect of regulations in the MDA in 21 U.S.C. § 371(a), but it did not do the same through the 
FDA. Id. 
166. Id. at 1201-02. 
167. Id.  See generally Brief of Former FDA Commissioners, supra note 44, at 7 (discussing 
the FDA’s prior views on state tort suits and preemption). 
168. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202. 
169. Id. at 1202-03. 
170. See, e.g., Brief of DES Action as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14, 
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249); Brief of Former FDA Commissioners, supra note 
44, at 17, 23-24; Brief of New England Journal of Medicine Editors and Authors as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondent at 6-7, Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief 
of New England Journal of Medicine Editors and Authors]. 
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the FDA often relies on information from manufacturers.171  With 11,000 
drugs on the market, the FDA does not have the resources to discover all 
the risks in drugs premarket or on-market.172  State tort suits uncover un-
known drug hazards, motivate manufacturers to provide for greater safety, 
and compensate victims who otherwise would have no remedy.173  The 
majority opinion ruled in favor of greater consumer remedies rather than 
out of concern for drug manufacturers.174 
The separate opinions, on the other hand, show conflict preemption 
issues are far from settled.175  Justice Breyer highlighted areas where pre-
emption may still exist.176  Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, in 
which he questioned the implied conflict preemption tests the Court uses—
which he thinks “wander far” from what the U.S. Constitution requires—
and declared the impossibility test too narrow and the purposes and 
objectives test too broad.177  In his dissent, Justice Alito came to the 
opposite conclusion of the majority on many issues and would have ruled in 
the manner Justice Thomas fears.178 
B. JUSTICE BREYER’S CONCURRENCE 
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion.179  
Justice Breyer stated state tort law did not conflict with a federal regulatory 
scheme in Levine but stressed FDA regulations may bear the force of 
law.180  Justice Breyer noted state tort law may “interfere with the FDA’s 
desire to create a drug label containing a specific set of cautions and 
instructions.”181  Justice Breyer expressed the FDA should be allowed to 
determine when state torts suits are preempted based on Congressional 
purposes and objectives.182  Justice Breyer was also concerned about the 
rising prices of drugs if state tort suits were allowed to continue unabated, 
which was a popular argument from pro-business groups who wanted to 
 
171. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202; Brief of New England Journal of Medicine Editors and 
Authors, supra note 170, at 8, 10. 
172. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 n.11.  See also Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 
545 n.6 (2008) (discussing that overburdened  agencies charged with regulating an “enormous 
amount of activity” should not be the exclusive source of regulation). 
173. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1204-31. 
176. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
177. Id. at 1205-09 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
178. Id. at 1217-31 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
179. Id. at 1190. 
180. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
181. Id. 
182. Id.  Justice Breyer failed to state why he thinks the FDA has this authority. See id. 
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take the burden of a common law duty off manufacturers.183  Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence focused on possibilities where preemption may still 
exist in suits similar to Levine’s. 
C. JUSTICE THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT 
Justice Thomas did not approve of the implied preemption tests the 
Court has crafted over the years.184  First, Justice Thomas repeated and 
expanded upon his often-stated disagreement with the purposes and 
objectives conflict preemption jurisprudence.185  Justice Thomas argued 
Congress’s purposes and objectives were “potentially boundless” and that 
“musings . . . do not satisfy the Art. I, § 7 requirements for enactment of 
federal law.”186  Justice Thomas wrote “the purposes and objectives [of] 
pre-emption jurisprudence is inherently flawed” because it looks at the 
unwritten purposes and objectives of hundreds of individuals comprising 
Congress.187  Justice Thomas would look to the law Congress actually 
makes, as the supremacy clause requires, rather than atextual notions or 
congressional inaction.188 
Justice Thomas also questioned the majority’s adoption of the “physi-
cal impossibility” standard and asked for an explanation of why this is the 
precise standard.189  Justice Thomas argued “[t]here could be instances 
where it is not ‘physically impossible’ to comply with both state and federal 
law, even when the state and federal laws give directly conflicting com-
mands.”190  However, Justice Thomas did agree there was no direct conflict 
in Levine’s case because there are no regulations stating an FDA-approved 
label must remain in force without ever being changed, although he said the 
majority opinion may lead to “freewheeling” evaluations.191  Justice 
Thomas’s opinion noted the same conflict preemption cases may lead to 
different and even opposite conclusions.192  Justice Thomas stated he “can 
no longer assent to a doctrine that pre-empts state laws merely because they 
 
183. Id. at 1204. 
184. Id. at 1205. 
185. Id.  Justice Thomas wrote, “Under this approach, the Court routinely invalidates state 
laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or 
generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal 
law.” Id.  Justice Thomas believes the tests the majority uses are inconsistent with the Consti-
tution. Id. 
186. Id. at 1207. 
187. Id. at 1211. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 1209. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 1211, 1217. 
192. Id. at 1213-15 (citing the use of Geier by the majority and the dissent). 
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‘stan[d] as an obstacle’” to the purposes and objectives of Congress.193  
Justice Thomas believed the majority opinion gave “improperly broad pre-
emptive effect to judicially manufactured policies[,]” but the dissent came 
to the opposite conclusion that the majority “undermine[d] . . . broader pre-
emption jurisprudence and the broader workability of the federal drug-
labeling regime.”194 
D. JUSTICE ALITO’S DISSENT 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia joined Justice Alito’s dis-
sent.195  The dissent began by stating Levine’s claim was simple medical 
malpractice and should not have constituted an insufficient warning claim 
against the manufacturer at all.196  The dissent relied on the FDA’s judg-
ments regarding the safety and effectiveness of drugs, regardless of whether 
the FDA’s decisions were wise.197  Instead of applying the presumption 
against preemption, the dissent would have allowed a state tort suit here 
only if the FDCA expressly allowed it.198  Likewise, the dissent said the 
FDA did set the floor and the ceiling on labeling requirements.199  The 
dissent argued the FDA only set minimum standards if the FDCA expressly 
allowed, which was opposite of the majority’s decision that the FDA set 
minimum standards unless stated otherwise.200  The dissent read the clause, 
which the majority determined to be a savings clause, as merely 
recognizing the existence of conflict preemption, as in Geier.201 
The dissent argued the majority opinion in Levine turned “yesterday’s 
dissent into today’s majority opinion.”202  The dissent compared the FDA to 
the Department of Transportation in Geier by declaring the FDA struck a 
 
193. Id. at 1217. 
194. Id. at 1217, 1222. 
195. Id. at 1190.  Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts later recused himself in Bruesewitz v. 
Wyeth, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010), because he owned stock in Pfizer, Inc., and Pfizer acquired Wyeth 
in late 2009.  Tony Mauro Comment to The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times, Roberts Recuses in 
New Wyeth Case, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/03/roberts-recuses-in-wyeth-case.html 
(Mar. 8, 2010, 13:06).  Reportedly, Chief Justice Roberts did not recuse himself in Wyeth v. 
Levine because the merger had not yet taken place. Id.  See also Justice Robert’s Portfolio, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/22/ 
AR2009022201649.html. 
196. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1217-18. 
197. Id. at 1218. 
198. Id. at 1219.  Justice Alito also stated the presumption is irrelevant in conflict preemption 
analysis after Geier and questioned the “long-standing” nature of the presumption. Id. at 1228-29. 
199. Id. at 1221. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 1227. 
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sensitive balance in its determinations, which should not be upset.203  
Further, the dissent did not find a difference between the express 
preemption clause of the FDA and what it argued was the implied 
preemptive effect of the FDCA.204  Justice Alito further wrote the FDA’s 
preamble did have the force of law because other FDA decisions have the 
force of law.205  In general, the dissent expressed great distaste for allowing 
jury verdicts where a federal agency regulates.206 
The dissent argued juries are “ill-equipped” to determine the cost-
benefit balance of warning label safety.207  The dissent stated the Court 
erred by concluding the FDA had not adequately considered the risks of IV-
push.208  Further, the dissent read the jury verdict as requiring the manu-
facturer to contraindicate IV-push in disregard of the FDA’s decision not 
to.209  The dissent disagreed with most of the jury’s findings, noting 
Phenergan’s label contained sufficient warnings against the very risk at 
issue.210  Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion determined state tort claims like 
Levine’s could not coexist with the FDA’s determinations because the 
FDA’s original decision found Phenergan’s label safe while the Vermont 
jury found Phenergan’s label unsafe regarding the risks of IV-push 
administration.211 
IV. IMPACT 
The Court clarified points of contention in Levine.  First, courts may 
use the absence of express preemption as evidence Congress did not intend 
for implied preemption to exist.212  The presumption against preemption is 
more important than it appeared to be after Geier.213  The Levine Court was 
also more lenient than the Geier Court in reading statutory language as an 
effective savings.214  The Court ensured the preemption defense will be 
difficult to plead where there is any available possibility of complying with 
both federal and state law.215  The purposes and objectives test is not so 
 
203. Id. at 1221, 1227. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 1228. 
206. Id. at 1229-30. 
207. Id. at 1229. 
208. Id. at 1222. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 1226-27. 
211. Id. at 1231. 
212. Id. at 1200. 
213. Id. at 1194-95. 
214. Compare id. at 1196, with Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 868 
(2000). 
215. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1198-99. 
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broad because congressional silence was interpreted as Congress not 
intending preemption to exist and preemption not fitting with the purpose of 
the FDCA and FDA regulations.216 
The Court’s decision in Levine also places a heavy burden on federal 
agencies desiring preemption of state tort suits.217  Agencies must first be 
given the authority by Congress to declare the preemptive effect of 
regulations, and then agencies must actually create preemptive regulations 
with the force of law because mere opinions do not suffice.218  An agency 
will not be presumed to have balanced the risks and benefits that create 
preemptive regulations.219  Specifically for the FDA, the MDA and the 
FDCA have different preemptive effects, even though the FDA implements 
both acts.220  After Levine¸ conflict preemption analyses should require 
detailed and specific findings on all regulations and agencies. 
The differing opinions in Levine show there are issues left to be settled.  
Three members of the Court still oppose the use of the presumption against 
preemption and would use a somewhat reverse presumption in favor of 
federal agencies.221  Justice Thomas is adamantly opposed to the conflict 
preemption tests the Court uses and enumerated many weaknesses and 
uncertainties in conflict preemption principles.222  The resulting uncer-
tainties on conflict preemption tests, savings clauses, presumptions, and 
agency authority suggest each preemption claim will require an individu-
alized and specific analysis in order to determine if preemption does in fact 
exist.  The Court is still split on whether the FDA has the ability to create 
preemptive regulations.223  Further, the Court specifically did not answer 
whether a jury verdict mandating a particular warning would be preempted, 
as the Levine Court only said a verdict finding a label unsafe is not 
preempted.224  Subsequent cases have proven there are other resulting 
questions after Wyeth v. Levine.225 
 
216. Id. at 1199-1200. 
217. Id. at 1201-04. 
218. Id. at 1200-01. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 1200 (noting the MDA has an express preemption provision, but the FDCA does 
not). 
221. See id. at 1220 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that when the FDA determines a drug is 
safe, no state may countermand the FDA’s determination). 
222. See id. at 1209, 1211 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that “physical impossibility” may 
not be the best standard and that the purposes and objectives test is inherently flawed). 
223. See id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
224. Id. at 1194. 
225. See infra Part IV.A. 
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A. IMPACT ON SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS 
The Levine decision has been called a “sea change” in preemption 
analysis.226  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opined Levine restored 
conflict preemption to its pre-2001 form.227  A federal district court noted 
the Supreme Court had been moving away from finding conflict preemption 
based on alleged conflicts with purposes underlying federal regulations 
even before Levine.228  A state court determined the Geier decision has been 
specifically limited since Levine provides that conflict preemption based on 
agency regulation exists only where “there is an extensive contemporaneous 
history, and detailed agency explanations.”229  In particular, Levine contra-
dicts several prior cases that gave preemptive effect to the FDCA’s 
preamble.230  Wyeth v. Levine has already resolved conflict preemption 
claims for several courts with suits based on similar facts and claims as 
Levine.231  Levine answered important questions in the “tens of thousands of 
individual claims, and potentially millions of class actions claims” pending 
in federal and state courts where plaintiffs claimed FDA-approved labels 
were defective.232  Further, the Supreme Court vacated judgment in 
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,233 a preemption case similar to Levine, and 
remanded the case back to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals after 
Levine.234 
Levine strengthened certain principles in conflict preemption jurispru-
dence.  Courts have found a “renewed emphasis” on the presumption 
against preemption.235  Precedent not applying the presumption may be 
 
226. Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 2010). 
227. Id. at 391. 
228. Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1207-08 
(D.N.M. 2010).  President Barack Obama issued a memorandum to federal agencies discouraging 
the creation of preemption.  See Tenuto v. Lederle Labs., No. 1134/81, 2010 WL 625223, at *7-8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 2010). 
229. Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 680 S.E.2d 77, 94 (W. Va. 2009). 
230. Brockert v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 287 S.W.3d 760, 766 (Tex. App. 2009). 
231. Mason, 596 F.3d at 396; Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (W.D. 
Okla. 2009); Aaron v. Wyeth, No. 2:07cv927, 2010 WL 653984, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2010). 
232. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 12-14.  Footnote four of the Petition 
directed attention toward several class action suits with thousands of members. Id. at 14 n.4.  
Wyeth stated the individual suits were “too numerous to count.” Id. 
233. 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009). 
234. Colacicco, 129 S. Ct. at 1578-79.  The Third Circuit had previously determined the 
presumption against preemption applied with minimal force, the brand and generic drug claims 
were impliedly preempted, and the FDA’s preamble statements were entitled to deference.  
Colacicco, 521 F.3d 253, 285 (3d Cir. 2008).  Further, the United States retracted its amicus brief 
for Colacicco after Levine.  Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 443 (5th Cir. 2010). 
235. Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1208 (D.N.M. 
2010); Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the presumption, but still 
holding conflict preemption existed). 
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called into question.236  The presumption applies in any field where there is 
a history of state law regulation, even if there is also a history of federal 
regulation.237  Further, courts have applied the interpretation that disfavors 
preemption where there were two possible interpretations of the preemptive 
effect of regulations.238 
Lower courts have relied on the Court’s assertion that state tort suits 
and manufacturer duties remain important where federal regulations exist 
but federal remedies do not.239  The absence of a federal remedy for injured 
plaintiffs has served as evidence for courts that Congress did not intend a 
federal law or regulation to preempt state law or lawsuits.240  Additionally, 
some courts have determined the absence of express preemption provisions 
is further proof that Congress did not intend for implied preemption.241  
Those courts have specifically looked at an agency’s explanation when 
examining the possible preemptive effect of regulations, but did not rely on 
agency conclusions on whether regulations have preemptive effect.242  
Agency positions on the preemptive effect of regulations seem entitled to 
“interpretational deference” only where clearly consistent with 
congressional intent and where the agency has not waivered on its 
interpretation.243 
Courts have also decided drug manufacturer defendants cannot prove 
implied preemption unless the defendants can prove through “clear evi-
dence”244 the FDA would not have accepted stronger or better warnings.245  
 
236. N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 603 F. Supp. 2d 715, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
237. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 178 (1st Cir. 2009). 
238. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1225; Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
239. Aaron v. Wyeth, No. 2:07cv927, 2010 WL 653984, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2010). 
240. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 
588 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating Congress’s purpose was not to shield manufacturers 
from tort liability for private parties without other remedy); Dorsett v. Sandoz, 699 F. Supp. 2d 
1142, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (noting Levine shows the congressional purpose behind the FDCA 
was not to shield manufacturers from liability). 
241. In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d at 174-75; Holk, 575 F.3d 
at 337.  One court accepted Justice Thomas’s concurring statements that congressional “musings” 
should not preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.  Herrera, 690 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1226. 
242. Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1214 (9th Cir. 2009). 
243. Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 950 (9th Cir. 2010). 
244. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1198 (2009) (stating “absent clear evidence that 
the FDA would not have approved a change” the Court will not conclude it was impossible to 
comply with both federal and state requirements). 
245. Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 395 (7th Cir. 2010); Mensing, 588 
F.3d at 611; see also Demahy, 593 F.3d at 435 (stating mere “uncertainty about the FDA’s 
response makes federal preemption less likely”). 
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The clear evidence requirement has been called “demanding.”246  In one 
case, the clear evidence requirement was not met where the FDA examined 
data on risks but did not change a warning label because failure to act still 
did not prove the FDA clearly would have rejected stronger warnings.247  In 
another case, even where the FDA rejected some of the plaintiff’s suggested 
warnings, the plaintiff’s remaining claims were not preempted because the 
claims included other warnings not specifically rejected by the FDA.248  
Likewise, the clear evidence requirement was held not met where the FDA 
rejected a warning but the manufacturer acquiesced and made no further 
attempt to ensure the warning label was safe.249  Defendant manufacturers 
can no longer claim state tort requirements are preempted just because a 
federal agency did not mandate a certain warning, because failure to man-
date does not mean the warning clearly would have been rejected by a 
federal agency.250 
The Levine decision has been applied to cases outside of drug manu-
facturing claims.  The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 
208, which was at issue in Geier, where FMVSS 208 preempted a state 
lawsuit, was found not to preempt claims in a defective vehicle suit where 
the vehicle did not have side airbags.251  The defendant claimed conflict 
preemption based on the purposes and objectives of FMVSS 208, but the 
court determined a suit on side impact airbags actually furthered the 
purposes and objectives of FMVSS 208.252  The rationale behind Geier did 
not apply because FMVSS 208 did not contain a side airbag requirement.253  
Further, the particular and specific scheme at issue in Geier relied on 
balancing the risks and benefits of airbags and the same scheme was not “in 
effect” for the alleged defective vehicle in this case.254  The district court 
 
246. Mason, 596 F.3d at 393 (noting the FDA’s decision against using proposed warnings 
was not considered “clear evidence” the FDA would have rejected stronger warnings). 
247. Forst v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 639 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954 (E.D.Wis. 2009) 
(observing the FDA did not prohibit all enhanced warnings, nor did it preclude changes of specific 
labeling elsewhere). 
248. See Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharms., 682 F. Supp. 2d 662, 678 (N.D. 
Tex. 2010) (noting the plaintiffs’ claim would have been preempted if limited only to the failure to 
specifically warn of possible side effects of Motrin, but the plaintiffs’ claims included the failure 
to warn of the symptoms of side effects, and therefore preemption did not exist because the FDA 
had not rejected a warning on the symptoms). 
249. Aaron v. Wyeth, No. 2:07cv927, 2010 WL 653984, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2010). 
250. Dorsett v. Sandoz, 699 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
251. Durham v. County of Maui, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151 (D. Haw. 2010) (denying 
summary judgment for the defendant). 
252. Id. at 1158. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
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determined FMVSS 208 set only minimum standards and applied the 
presumption against preemption.255 
Geier was distinguished in another case where the plaintiff claimed the 
warnings in a vehicle’s owner’s manual regarding airbags were insuffi-
cient.256  There, the court determined FMVSS 208 established only the 
minimum standard for warnings on airbags.257  FMVSS 208 had a preemp-
tive effect in Geier because manufacturers were given specific options and 
the plaintiff’s suit in Geier would have “foreclosed” those options.258  An 
agency may require certain warnings, but if the agency does not forbid 
additional warnings, then a manufacturer may still have a duty under state 
law that may be enforced by a state court.259 
The Court’s rationale in Levine has been applied outside of products 
liability lawsuits, where a federal district court determined state law con-
sumer protection statutes on advertising may complement federal law just 
as state common law duties may.260  An implied preemption defense was 
denied where the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) had exten-
sive regulations but states also exercised police powers to regulate or 
prohibit telecommunications that harm citizens.261  Another district court 
determined Levine’s provision that state law may be preempted by an agen-
cy regulation with the force of law applied to express preemption chal-
lenges as well.262  The “demanding” physical impossibility test has been 
applied to deny a preemption defense by a national securities exchange 
registered with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding 
claims based on an assault on the floor of the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange.263 
However, the Levine decision was not extended to a design defect 
claim where the plaintiff claimed the drug Redux was an “unreasonably 
dangerous drug for which no warning would have been adequate[,]” even 
though it had been approved by the FDA.264  The court distinguished Levine 
first because Levine was a failure to warn claim, and the present claim was 
 
255. Id. at 1158-59, 61.  FMVSS 208 set both a “floor and a ceiling” in Geier but not in 
Durham, which supports the conclusion that courts must make detailed and specific 
determinations regarding the preemptive effect of regulations.  See supra Parts II.C.2, III.A.3. 
256. Cook v. Ford Motor Co., 913 N.E.2d 311, 324-25 (Ind. App. 2009). 
257. Id. at 325. 
258. Id. at 324. 
259. Id. at 325. 
260. See In re Bayer Corp. Combination Aspirin Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 701 
F. Supp. 2d 356, 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
261. Palmer v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231-32 (W.D. Wash. 2009). 
262. Rooney v. Philadelphia, 623 F. Supp. 2d 644, 664 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
263. See Dooner v. DiDonato, 971 A.2d 1187, 1200 (Pa. 2009). 
264. Longs v. Wyeth, 621 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507-09 (N.D. Ohio 2009). 
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not.265  Further, Levine focused on the manufacturer’s duties after a drug 
was on the market, and the present claims were based on the manufacturer’s 
duties before market approval.266  The court upheld the order of summary 
judgment in favor of the drug manufacturer, Wyeth, because the plaintiff’s 
design defect claims were based on pre-FDA approval duties, federal law 
preempted such claims, and the plaintiff neglected to provide evidence to 
refute the defendant’s evidence that the drug label warnings were adequate 
as a matter of law.267 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the presumption against 
preemption in a suit against Sallie Mae for fraudulent misrepresentations in 
billing statements and coupon books, but still held the claims were pre-
empted.268  Conflict preemption existed where the relevant agency’s posi-
tion was “in harmony” with congressional intent, so the agency was entitled 
to deference.269  Further, the agency had no “dramatic change” in position 
regarding the preemptive effect of its regulations, so its opinion was not 
viewed with the same suspicion as the FDA’s in Levine.270  The court still 
conducted an independent review in compliance with Levine, but the court 
ultimately agreed with the agency’s interpretation and accorded deference 
to the agency’s opinion.271 
Levine was followed with a split in the federal circuits regarding 
whether generic drug warning claims are preempted.272  Some courts 
determined claims against generic drug manufacturers are still preempted, 
in part because those courts determined CBE regulations do not allow 
manufacturers to change warning labels without FDA approval.273  Other 
courts decided that after Levine, conflict preemption is not a defense for 
generic drug manufacturers.274  One court noted generic drugs “ride the 
 
265. Id. at 509. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 506. 
268. See Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 950 (9th Cir. 2010). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Stacel v. Tera Pharms., USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 906 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
273. Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 672 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  However, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the FDA previously expressed in a footnote to the CBE 
regulations that generic drug manufacturers could not use CBE regulations, but the FDA has since 
removed the footnote.  Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 443-44 (5th Cir. 2010). 
274. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 436-49; Bartlett v. Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279, 
305 (D.N.H. 2009); Couick v. Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:09CV210RJCD, 2009 WL 4670637, at *3 
(W.D.N.C. Sep. 30, 2009); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (D. Vt. 2009); Stacel, 620 
F. Supp. 2d at 906.  Levine has also been applied to deny a conflict preemption defense for an 
over-the-counter drug manufacturer.  Valdes v. Optimist Club of Suniland, Inc., 27 So. 3d 689, 
691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
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coattails” of brand name drugs.275  First, the federal regulations about ge-
neric drugs do not address post-FDA approval modifications to warnings.276  
However, generic drug manufacturers must at least initiate label changes.277  
Second, CBE regulations do not forbid generic drug manufacturers from 
changing warning labels if the changes are meant to make the drug safer.278  
Third, Levine supports a conclusion that generic drug manufacturers have a 
duty to ensure warning labels remain safe because generic drug regulations 
specifically do not prohibit manufacturers from directly warning or request-
ing the FDA to warn doctors of newly discovered risks.279  Finally, the 
FDCA’s purposes and objectives, which the Court subscribed to in Levine, 
apply as much to generic drugs as they do to brand name drugs.280  After 
Levine, courts seem reluctant to rely on FDA opinions and prior amicus 
briefs that endorse preemption of claims against generic drug manufac-
turers.281 
B. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA LAW 
Wyeth v. Levine affirmed that manufacturers owe a duty under state 
laws to maintain the safety and effectiveness of their labels.282  Although 
Levine provides opportunities for residents in every state to seek remedies 
despite the existence of federal regulations, North Dakota’s products 
liability law is not well-settled.283  Plaintiffs seeking recovery under North 
Dakota law must also overcome a rebuttable presumption against defects.284  
The presumption a product is free from defects exists where warnings and 
instructions for a product are in conformity with government standards.285  
Despite Levine, North Dakota law seems unfavorable to a plaintiff claiming 
a defective product due to warnings and instructions which have been 
approved by the FDA. 
However, North Dakota suits may still implicate the Levine analysis.  
The pre-Levine confusion was exemplified in a federal case from the 
 
275. Munroe v. Barr Labs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302-03 (N.D. Fla. 2009). 
276. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 436, 444. 
277. Id. at 437-38; Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 608-09 (8th Cir. 2009). 
278. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 440-41. 
279. Id. at 444-45; Mensing, 588 F.3d at 608-09. 
280. Demahy, 593 F.3d at 448-49. 
281. Dorsett v. Sandoz, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
282. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1197-98, 1202 (2009). 
283. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-07(2) (1995) (providing the “problems with the current 
civil justice system” were codified along with the need for reform). 
284. § 28-01.3-09. 
285. Id. 
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District of North Dakota.  The Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc.286 decision 
agreed that the FDCA “‘smacks’ of preemption,” yet the law was not “cut 
and dried.”287  The district court ended its discussion by concluding it could 
not determine the MDA and the FDA were actually different or that pre-
emption did not apply to the plaintiffs’ strict liability and negligence claims 
regarding the drug Adderall’s label.288  The court decided preemption might 
apply because the FDA dictated the contents of Adderall’s label, and the 
court found the manufacturer was prohibited from changing the label 
without the FDA’s approval.289  The court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant manufacturer on the court’s shaky preemption 
stance, as well as other theories.290  Levine and changes in the FDCA do not 
support the court’s reasoning, and the Ehlis decision should not be cited as 
precedent because the court found no difference between the FDCA and the 
MDA, and the court did not recognize the manufacturer’s duty to amend 
defective warning labels.291  However, the Ehlis plaintiff’s proposed “black 
box” warning, a particular warning surrounded by a black box on the label, 
may still be preempted after Levine because the FDA may have already 
rejected that particular warning.292 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Levine, the United States Supreme Court toughened the implied 
conflict preemption test in areas of the law traditionally regulated by states 
by applying the presumption against preemption.293  The Court reiterated 
congressional purpose is still the ultimate touchstone in finding conflict 
preemption.294  An impossibility defense under conflict preemption is diffi-
cult to assert because it must be absolutely impossible for a defendant to 
have complied with both the federal and state regulations in order to claim 
 
286. 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.N.D. 2002).  The father of a five-week-old girl killed the 
infant after taking the drug Adderall.  Ehlis, F. Supp. 2d at 1190.  He alleged Adderall caused 
psychosis and sued the drug manufacturer in part because the drug’s warning label did not warn 
about this effect. Id. at 1190-91. 
287. Id. at 1197. 
288. Id. at 1198. 
289. Id. 
290. Id.  The court granted summary judgment because of the learned intermediary doctrine. 
Id. 
291. See generally Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (making extremely detailed findings and 
rejecting similar preemption claims). 
292. See id. at 1194 (declining to answer whether a verdict mandating a particular warning 
was preempted—though it should be noted the plaintiff Levine did originally request a specific 
warning). 
293. See supra Part III.A.1. 
294. Id. 
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the defense.295  The mere presence of the FDA and the FDCA do not prove 
Congress’s purposes and objectives were to vest a federal agency with 
exclusive authority over the safety and effectiveness of drug labels.296  
Ultimately, drug manufacturers retain responsibility to ensure their labels 
are safe and effective, and merely using an FDA-approved label may be 
insufficient to provide a conflict preemption defense.297  Congress intended 
the FDA’s regulations to be supplemented by state tort suits rather than be 
preemptive of such suits.298  Finally, the FDA cannot unilaterally declare 
state tort suits are preempted.299 
Charlotte J. Skar* 
 
295. See supra Part III.A.2. 
296. See supra Part III.A.3. 
297. Id. 
298. See supra Part III.A.4. 
299. Id. 
*2010 J.D. with distinction from the University of North Dakota School of Law.  Thank you 
to Paul LeBel for inspiring this article. 
